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WOODMAN v. SPENCER.
Where a conveyance of land'describes it as bounded by a stream not navigahle,
or by a highway, whatever terms may be used in describing such boundary, it
must be construed as extending to the middle of the same, unless there is a clear
expression of an intention to limit it to the margin of such stream or way.
The reason of this rule is the strong and controlling presumption that it was not
the intention of the grantor to retain in himself a strip of land subject to an easement in the public which might be perpetual, and therefore of no comparative use
to him, and that it was equally not the intention of the grantee to cut himself off
from the privileges of an adjoining owner in the fee of the highway and to run the
risk of leaving his land inaccessible in case the public easement in the road should
be surrendered.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court, which
was delivered by
LADD, J.-It 'was agreed that the defendant, at the time of his
conveyance to' the plaintiff, had the title which came to Theophilus
Ladd by the deed of James Brown and wife, and the question
before the referees was whether the defendant, by virtue of that
deed, had the titleto the highways as the same are conveyed in
his deed to the plaintiff. The main matter for our opinion, therefore, is the construction to be put upon the description of the
premises in the deed of Brown and wife to Ladd, as regards the
highways mentioned therein.
The plan used before the referees, and by them made part of
this case, shows that the land covered by the deed in question,
though described as three distinct and separate parcels, lay
together in a single body, quite compact in form, along two highways, the River road aid the Harran road, which herd intersect,
forming nearly a right'angle. This L-shaped tract of land, composing the farm, is in fact divided into three. pieces by the two
roads which traverse it, viz. : (1) one piece containing twenty
acres, more or less, lying wholly east of the River road and between that road and the Pemigewasset river; (2) one piece containing fifty-five acres,-m-ore or less, on which stand the barn and
shed, lying in the north-west opening or angle formed by the junction of the two roads-that is, west of the River road and north
of the Harran road; (8) one piece lying in the north-west angle
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of the two roads-that is, west of the River road and north of the
IHarran road, containing one-half acre, more or less, on which
stands the house; and the only description of the premises in the
deed is a separate description of each of these three parcels.
Does that description cover the roads, or is an intention to exclude
the roads thereby made so clear and manifest as to admit of no
other construction ?
*
*
*
*
*
* The plaintiff relies mainly upon the language used in describing
each of the tracts, -which he says clearly and unmistakably
excludes the roads. In the particular to which our attention has
been directed, the description of the three pieces is substantially
the same. We may therefore examine the description of the first
piece-that lying east of the River road-which is as follows:
"thence westerly * * * to the River road; thence northerly on
the easterly side of said road to the northerly line of lot numbered
twenty-six, * * * meaning by this deed to convey all the land I
own on the easterly side of the River road." It is said that the
words "to the River road, thence northerly on the easterly side.of
said road," are capable of no construction except such as makes
the westerly line of this tract the easterly margin rather than the
centre line of the strip devoted to the public use for a highway.
It has long been settled in this state that where there is nothing
to control it, a grant running to and then bounding on a highway,
extends to the centre of the road: Read's Petition, 13 N. H1. 381;
Nichols v. Suncook Mfg. Co., 34 Id. 345; Bix v. Johnson, 5 Id.
520; Kimball v. Schoff, 40 Id. 190; Goodno v. Hutchinson,
Co~is December Term 1873; and no question is made but that
if the words here had been "thence on said road," instead of
"thence on the easterly side of said road," one-half the road
would be included. Let us see what is the difference.
In the first place, the approved constr ction with respect to a
bounding upon, by or along a highway, is anomalous.* We are
told that the highway is to be regarded and treated as a monument,
like a tree, a wall and the like, the centre of which marks the location of- the line. But why should it be so regarded and treated ?
A highway is nothing more or less than a strip of land appropriated to a particular public use, and subject to certain rights in
the public. The thing itself to which the easement attaches is
simply a strip of land. If, then, we look only at the actual character of the thing adopted as a boundary, a strip of land four
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rods wide used for a highway is no more a. monument than a strip
of land four rods wide used by an adjoining proprietor for a
garden. Nor does the deed on its face show any intention to
adopt the whole strip of land instead of its marginal line as a
monument, thus locating the line at the centre of the strip, in one
case any more than in the other. It is unnecessary to cite authorities to the point that a bounding of one piece of land upon, by
or along another piece, even though such other piece be in the
shape of a narrow slip, locates the line at the edge or margin of the
slip, and not through its centre.
The question then returns, why should the line be carried to the
centre of the highway by construction, while in the other case
supposed it is by construction placed at the margin of the strip ?
The answer to this question is found either in the ratio decidendi
or in express terms, in every case where the doctrine has been
applied, viz. : the strong and controlling presumption that it was
not the intention of the grantor to except from the operation of
his deed, and so retain in himself, the fee to a long narrow strip
of land (one-half the width of the road), subject to an easement in
the public which may be perpetual, and that it was not the intention of the grantee to accept a deed which should give him none
of the usual rights of an adjoining owner in the soil of the highway, and which may have the effect to leave his premises inaccessible in case the rights of the public in the road should be surrendered.
Ordinarily the benefit to the grantor of retaining his right in
the soil of the road would be so small as to be almost or quite
inappreciable. Ordinarily the present actual inconvenience to the
grantee, together with the possible and even probable damage that
may in the future result to him upon the discontinuance of the
road, would be matter of very considerable importance, enough to
interfere seriously, in most cases, with the price which could be
obtained for the land. It is improbable that a man will insist on
an exception, the only and certain effect of which must be to materially diminish the saleable value of his land when he is to gain
nothing by the exception. It is improbable that two men Pave
understandingly entere into a bargain which contains a stipulation plainly and clearly to the disadvantage of both. A priori
they would not be likely to do such a thing; a posteriori it is not
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likely they have done it. The language of the deed is to be read
in the light of this improbability.
This consideration, with others of'a like nature, has led courts
to adopt the rule of construction we are discussing, said to rest on
a presumption that when the granted premises are bounded by or
on a highway, it was the intention of the parties to treat the whole
strip as a monument and locate the line at the centre; in other
words, upon a conclusion of fact as to the intention of the parties,
made up by the court from a consideration of the nature and situation of the thing to which the deed relates in connection with the
literal language in which they have undertaken to express that
intention.
In the deed before us the language is, "thence on the easterly
side of the road," and the contention is that the parties meant a
different thing when they said, "on the side of the road," from what
they would have meant had they said, "on the road." What is
there in the nature of the thing described to suggest any such
difference in meaning ? The bounding of one piece of land by or
upon another fixes the line at the margin of such other piece.
Carrying the line over to the centre of a highway is, as we have
seen, an anomaly in the construction of deeds, which rests upon a
presumed intention not to exclude, or perhaps the want of a distinctly formed intention to exclude, what neither party may have
known could come within the operation of the deed at all. If we
were to apply the usual canon of construction, the words, "on the
road," just as clearly and unmistakably denote an intention to
bound the land by the marginal line of the highway as do the
words, "on the side of the road." Considering only the nature of
the thing and the commonly received import of the words, the two
expressions are substantially identical and might be used interchangeably without altering the sense.
Improved land bordering on a highway is generally separated
fr6m the highway by a fence, which runs along the margin of the
strip thus devoted to public use. That portion of the land of a
farm which is available for the ordinary purposes of husbandry
includes no part of the highways that cross it. Such strips of land*
are ordinarily and naturally looked upon as being, to all practical
intents, wholly withdrawn as well from the control as from the
beneficial enjoyment of the adjoining owner by the servitude to
which they are subject. For this reason it is to be expected that the
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expres.rions, "on the road," or, "on the side of the road," will find
their way into deeds where the intention was not to except any
part of the road; and I confess it seems to me little less than
absurd to attempt a distinction between two forms of expression
evidently intended to convey the same idea, and which, in the
ordinary and correct use .of tihe language, do convey the same
idea to the mind. It is only when we incorporate into the first
expression, "on the road," the canon of construction of which we
have spoken, making it the same as, "on the centre line of the
road," that any difference in the sense can be made to appear. But
there is no reason why effect should not be given to the obvious
intention of the parties in one case as much as in the other, and
no reason why the same rule of construction should not be applied
to one of two equivalent expressions as well as to the other. I
therefore think that if we examine only the language uned in
describing the first parcel mentioned in this deed, and apply to it
the well-settled rules of construction respecting boundaries upon
highways, but one result is possible, namely that the westerly line
of this parcel is located at the centre line of the highway; and
this view is sustained, as I think, by all the cases in this state and
elsewhere, in which it has been held that a boundary on, by, or along
a highway or stream not navigable, in the absence of anything
else to control the description, locates the line at the centre instead
of the margin of such highway or stream. Those cases are very
numerous, and the doctrine is quite too well established to require
their citation. Only one case has been found, decided in a state
where the above doctrine is held, with which this conclusion seems
to be at variance. In Buck v. Squires, 22 Vt. 484, premises
were described as "beginning at the intersection of the road from
Chelsea Village to Allen's saw-mill, and the branch on which the
saw-mill stands, on the northerly side of said branch, nearly opposite my now dwelling-house, thence on the easterly side of said
road until the said road strikes the bank of said branch, thence
down said branch in the middle of the channel to the first-mentioned bound;" and it was held, by a divided court, that the
description excluded the whole road. There is, however, a wellconsidered and forcible-issenting opinion by Judge REDFIELD,
which, it would seem, must shake the authority of the case even
in the state where it was decided.
Johnson v. Anderson, 18 Me. 76, isdirectly in point. There
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the description in one deed was, "beginning on the westerly side
of the county road, thence running northerly, touching on the
westerly side of said road, forty rods." Then the line of boundary
leaves the westerly side of the road, and after describing the other
bounds, returns to the first-mentioned bound. It was held that
the description carried the fee in the highway to the centre of it.
This was the description in the plaintiff's deed. The defendant'
-deed of land lying opposite, on the other side of the same high
way, described the line next the highway as running "thence on
the said road." It does not seem to have occurred to the court
or counsel that there could be any real difference in the two
phrases, and exactly the same effect is given to each, namely, to
carry the fee to the centre of the road.
In Paul v. Carver,24 Penna. St. Rep. 207, the boundary was
brought by so many feet, "more or less, to Tidmarsh street, thence
south-easterly along the northerly side of said street," &c. On the
street being afterwards vacated, it was held that half of it passed
with the lot that was bounded by its northerly side. The only
difference I can see between that case and the present is that
there the line was brought by courses and distances on the ground
to the margin of the street, and from thence was actually located
by the precise terms of the description along the northerly side
of the street; while here there is nothing to locate the line, except
the words, "on the easterly side of said road." It is not necessary
to say whether we should go as far as this or not.
In Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 28, where it appeared that
the south line of the land conveyed was the same as the north line
of the highway, although the highway was not mentioned or
referred to in the deed, it was held that the conveyance transferred
the fee to the centre of the highway. WAITE, J., delivering the
judgment of the court, says: "An intention on the part of the
grantor to withhold his interest in the road after parting with all
his interest in the land adjoining, is never presumed. It ought to
appear in clear and explicit terms, so that the grantee may understand that the grantor's interest in the road is not conveyed.
Judge SWIFT, in the case of Stiles v. Curtis, 4 Day 838, says:
'If it had not been invariably understood that the conveyance of
land adjoining a highway conveyed the right of soil in it, express
words for that purpose would long since have been inserted in
deeds.' "
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In Ne,
whall v. Ireson, 8 Cush. 595, it was held that a deed
describing the boundary line of the land conveyed as running
northerly a certain distance to a highway, and from thence upon
the highway, passes the land to the centre of the highway, although
the distance specified, by actual measurement, carries the line only
to the southerly side of the highway. SHAW, C. J., who delivered
the opinion of the court, speaking of the fact that the last incasurement brought the line to the southerly side of the highway,
says: "The court are of opinion that does not rebut the strong
presumption that boundary on a highway is ad filun vice. The
road is a monument; the thread of the road, in legal contemplation, is that monument or abuttal. * * * Land may no doubt be
bounded by the side of a highway, butsit must be done in clear
and distinct terms, to control the ordinary presumption."
This case can hardly be distinguished from our own case of Biz
v. Johnson, 5 N. H. 520, decided nearly twenty years earlier. In
the latter case the description in the extent of an execution was"to a stake at the river, thence on the river N. 60 401 W. 28
perches, thence N. 390 50' W. 83 perches, thence N. 20' 20' W.
35 perches and 8 links to a stake by the river." The three courses
given described a line on Connecticut river, and it appeared that
the stakes mentioned were erected at the time of the extent, and
were placed between the ridge of the river-bank and the water,
the southerly one about one rod from the water's edge and the
northerly one at the distance of eight or ten feet. It was held
tht this description made the river the boundary, so that three or
four acres of alluvion which had formed by accretion upon the
easterh side of the river would belong to the person holding under
the extent. Here was a line established all the way by metes and
baqids, and noiihere touching the river, yet an intention to extend
the grant to the river was found in the words, "thence on the
river," and that intention was given the effect to overthrow a definite line established by a survey, and distinctly marked at each
end by monuments upon the ground. It certainly cannot be contended that the words, "on the side," go any further to show an
intention to exclude the road than does the exact mathematical
description, by courses an'"distances, of a line which does in fact
absolutely exclude the whole road. The objection to be overcome
seems quite as formidable, to say the least, in such cases as Newhall v. Ireson and .Rix v. Johnson, as in the present.
*
*
VOL. XXIII.-53
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The result is that the two roads, so far as they lie wholly within
the exterior lines of the three parcels, taken together are not to
be regarded as excepted in the deed of Brown to Ladd, and passed
by that deed; and as to those parts of the road which form part
of the exterior boundaries of the whole tract, that half of .them
adjoining the land conveyed passed by the deed, provided the
title thereto was in the grantor at the time of its execution.
The foregoing opinion seems to us so
entirely satisfactory that we should not
feel justified in occupying much time in
attempting to render it more perspicuous, being oppressed, as we should be,
by a salutary dread of any amendient of ours making it less so. Many
years back we had occasion to participate in the careful consideration of the
question with able associates, with whom
we could not agree, but who decided
that the question was one of intent
merely, to be determined like any other
question of construction, by the intention of the grantor, as drawn from the
words of the instrument as applied to
the subject-matter : Buck v. Squiers, 22
Vt. 484. Our own views, expressed in
that case, have undergone no change.
As they express our views of the ratio
dec;dej,d;, as it has been called, somewhat more fully upon a single point
than the opinion of Mr. Justice LADD,
we may be excused for repeating a brief
extract. "The rule itself is mainly
one of policy, and one which to the unprofessional might not seem of the first
importance; but it is at the same time one
which the American courts, especially,
have regarded as attended with very
serious consequences, when not rigidly
adhered to; and its chief object is to
prevent the existence of innumerable
strips and gores of land along the margins of streams and highways, to which
the title, for generations, shall remain
in abeyance, and then, upon the happening of some unexpected event, and
one, consequently, not in express-terms
provided for in the title-deeds, a boot-

less, almost objectless, litigation shall
spring up, to vex and harass those who
in good faith had supposed themselves
secure from such embarrassment. It is,
as I understand the law, to prevent the
occurrence of just such contingencies as
these thIat, in the leading, best-reasoned
and best-considered cases upon this subfject it is laid down and fully established
that courts will always extend the
boundaries of land deeded as extending
to and along the sides of highways and
fresh-water streams, not navigable, to
the middle of such streams and highways, if it can be done without manifest
violence to the words used in the conveyance. And to have this rule of the
least practical importance to cure the
evil, which it is intended to remedy, it
must be applied to every case where
there is not expressed an evident and
mcnffest intention to the contrary-one
from which no rational construction can
escape. The rule, to be of any practical utility, must be pushed somewhat to
the extreme of ordinary rules of construction, so as to apply to all cases,
when there is not a clearly expressed intention in the deed to limit the conveyance short of the middle of the stream
or way. If it is only to be applied, like
the ordinary rules of construction as to
boundary, so as to reach, as far as may
be, the clearly-formed idea in the mind
of the grantor at the time of executing
the deed, it will ordinarily be of no
utility as a rule of expediency or policy.
For, in ninety-nine cases in every hundred, the parties, at the time of the conveyance, do not esteem the land covered
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by the highway or stream of any importance either way; hence they use words
naturally descriptive of the prominent
idea in their minds at the time, and, in
d,-ing so, define the land which it is expected the party will occupy and improve." The law regards the boundary
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of land, upon streams and highways,
as embracing the whole stream or highway, and the precise limit as being a
line passing through the middle of such
boundary, the same as any other boundary of tree or stone.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of llinois.
WADHAMS v. GAY.
A testator devised to his nephew an estate in fee in remainder, to take effect on
the falling in of three lives, and the devisee survived to take. After the testator's
death, but before the estate in remainder became absolute, the nephew and his
children were impleaded in a bill in equity for partition of the testate estate, and
a decree passed purporting to be by consent, which, by mistake, erroneously
declared the nephew's estate to be for life only, with remainder in fee to his
children. That decree, made in 1851, omitted to order deeds to execute the limitations of estate thus declared to the children, and no such deeds were made.
Afterwards a bill of review was prosecuted by the nephew, and there was a decree
on that, reversing the partition decree. Soon after, the nephew's estate in fee
under the will became absolute; and, he dying, his daughter sued out a writ of
error, and on that procured a reversal of the bill of review decree, and.then
brought the present suit "to obtain execution of the decree in partition, and to
supply the omission therein, which is necessary to the efficacy of the decree, as
giving a remainder in fee to the children." The bill was against purchasers, holding by deeds in fee from the nephew, or from his grantees, with warranty of title
from him. Held:
Fir.st -Of those acquiring title while the bill of review decree was in force:
1. They were entitled to rely upon that decision, as the law which determined
what estate they took by purchase.
2. The subsequent reversal of that decree did not affect their rights.
3. A decree need give no day to a minor to show cause against it; it is absolute
in the first instance : Barnes v. Hadzeton, 50 Ill. 429, approved.
Second.-Of purchasers acquiring title while the consent decree in partition was
in force, and before its reversal by decree in review:
1. As to such, the principle applies that, on a bill to execute a decree, the court
will deny relief when it is seen the decree is injust. And a decree, appearing to proceed by consent, where in fact there was none, and none was intended,
cannot be deemed fair and just.
2. A decree in partition in chancery, before the statute of 1861, could not pass
a legal title to land ; and such a decree, omitting to order deeds, is in that respect
imperfect, and but the expression of a purpose without accomplishing or providing
the means to accomplish the object..
S. Where there is no valuable consideration, a court of equity upon its general
principles cannot complete what it finds imperfect.
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4. In the case of an intended gift of a legal estate, capable of a legal conveyance not made, the gift is revocable ; there being a locus paenitentife as long as it is
incomplete.
5. A girt or trust, capable of being made by a legal conveyance, is as imperfect when created by an executory decree providing no means of execution, as
when created by an executory contract.
6. The prosecution of a bill of a review to a decree, and also the making of
warranty deeds in fee, by the nephew, were an exercise on his part of the right to
revoke, while he occupied the locus pmnitentiw.
7. A consent decree, incomplete and ineffective, is not resjudicala. For the
court, on an application to render it effective, to look into its real nature and
character, does not militate with the doctrine of resjudicata. If otherwise, the
true nature of the bill would be to enforce a technical estoppel.
8. Though error of law shall not be alleged against a decree proceeding by
consent, so as to reverse it ; still, on an application to execute it, the court will
look to see if it be rightful or not, in determining whether it will act or remain
passive.

This was an appeal in equity.
Augustus Garrett by his will devised certain property to Charles
Flaglor in fee, in remainder after certain life-estates. After the testator's death, but before the estate in remainder became absolute,

Flaglor and his children were impleaded in a bill in equity for partition of the testator's estate, and a decree passed purporting to be by
consent, which, by mistake, erroneously declared Flaglor's estate to
be for life only, with remainder in fee to his children. That decree,
made in 1851, omitted to order deeds to execute the limitations
of estate thus declared to the children, and no such deeds were

made.

Afterwards a bill of review was prosecuted by Flaglor, and

there was a decree on that, reversing the partition decree.

Shortly

after this Flaglor's estate in fee under the will became vested in
present possession. Flaglor conveyed parts of his estate to various
grantees, some before and some after the decree upon his bill of

review. After his death his daughter, Mrs. Gay, sued out a writ
of error, and on that procured a reversal of the decree made on
the bill of review. • She then filed the present bill against Flaglor's grantees "to obtain execution of the decree in partition, and
to supply the omission therein, which is necessary to the efficacy
of the decree as giving a remainder in fee to the children of
Flaglor."
The Superior Court-having made
a decree as prayed, the defendants appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-[After reviewing the facts.]

In

e Jilton v.
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Xore, 1.3 Ill. 494, the well-settled law is recognised and declared,
that if a judginent is reversed, the parties are to be restored to
their original rights, so far as it can be (lone without prejudice to
third persons. But the rights of third persons are not affected.
Their title to property acquired under an erroneous judgment is
not divested by its reversal. To the same effect MeLagan v.
Brown, 11 Ill. 519; Goudy v. Hall, 36 Id. 319 ; Peaster v. 'leminq, 56 Id. 457; ,Sinmms v. Sloeum,'3 Cranch 300; lJoorhees v.
Bank of the United States, 10 Peters 475; Gray v. Brignardello, 1 Wall. 634. Nor is this principle confined to the case of
judicial sales as being founded on the public policy of sustaining
such sales. The same principle applies to judgments and decrees
w;hich simply declare an(d vest the legal right in the party claiming
it, where no sale has been had.
In IIorner v. Zimmerman, 45 Il1. 14, the principle was recognised in a case where there had been a decree of strict foreclosure
of a mortgage, that a bond fide purchaser for value from the mortgagee after the decree could not be affected by any error in the
decree. In Guiteau v. J1risley, 47 Ill. 433, where a party to an
erroneous judgment had purchased at a sale thereunder, and afterwards conveyed to a bond fide purchaser, and subsequently the
judgment was reversed, it was held that such bond fide purchaser
would not be affected by the reversal. The principle is, as said in
Goudy v. -Hrall,36 Ill. 319: "Society should be able to rely upon
the judgments and decrees of its courts; and although it knows
that they are liable to be reversed, yet it has a right, so long as
they stand, to presume that they have been properly rendered."
The case of Kettleby v. Lamb, 2 Chancery 404, quoted and
recognised by Lord REDESDALE, in Bennett v. .fammill, 2 Scho.

& Lef. 566, was that of a bill praying that a certain sum of money
in the hands of trustees might be laid out for the benefit of the
plaintiff. The bill was dismissed, and afterwards the trustees paid
time money to the other party, who claimed it. On a bill of review
that decree was reversed, yet the court determined thaft the trustees, who relied on the decree of dismission, signed and enrolled,
were protected in the payment they had made; and that the
plaintiff must look to the persons to whom the trustees paid it, on
the ground that the decree, while it remained in force, bound the
rights and justified the trustees, though they paid it voluntarily
and without suit. Lessee of Taylor v. Boyd, .3 Hammond (3 Ohio)
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337, and MeCormick v. LlIcClure, 6 Blackford 466, are cases of
decrees simply establishing the right to land ; and the parties in
whose favor the right was established by the decrees afterwards
made private sales of the land, and subsequently thereto the decrees were reversed. It was held in both cases that the reversal
did not affect the rights of the purchasers; that they acquired
valid titles, as established by the decrees under which they purchased.
In Gelpcke v. Oity of .Dubuque,1 Wall. 175, the same principle
was applied in a case where an act of the legislature of Iowa, authorizing the issue of municipal bonds in certain cases, had at one
time been decided by the Supreme Court of 'that state to be constitutional, and afterwards to be unconstitutional; and it was held
that bonds issued and put upon the market during the time the
first decision, holding the act constitutional, was in force, must be
governed as to their validity by such decision and be held valid;
such question of validity coming up after the making of the last
decision that the law was unconstitutional. So, in a recent unreported ease of the Court of Appeals of New York, Harris v. Jcy,
according to the note thereof which we have seen, where two mortgages had been executed prior to the passage of the Legal Tender
Act, and intermediate the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 605, holding that
act void as to antecedent contracts, and the reversal of that decision
in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, the owner of the equity of redemption tendered to the plaintiff payment of the mortgages in legal
tender notes, which was refused. It was held that the plaintiff, at
the time of the tender, had the right to rely upon the first decision,
which was then the law as applied to the relation of the parties;
and the tender being insufficient according to the law as then
declared, did not discharge the mortgages. The decree on the bill
of review then being in full force at the time these rights were
acquired from and under Moses, the parties acquiring such rights
were entitled to rely upon that decision as the law which determined what was the estate which Charles D. Flaglor had in the
lands. That decree declared such estate to be a remainder in fee,
and we are of the op-"ion that such was the estate which the
Engles and Day took by their purchase, and which they now hold
*
*
indefeasibly.
The partition of an estate in a court of chancery is not finally
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completed until mutual conveyances are executed of the allotments
made to the several parties. As said by Lord REDESDALE, in
ljrhateb, v. Dawson, 2 Sell. & Lef. 371, "partition in equity proceeds upon conveyances to be executed by the parties, and if the
parties be not competent to execute the conveyances, the partition
cannot be effectually had." A court of equity acts in personam :
Penn v. Erl Baltimore, Yes. Sr. 447. In all suits in equity
tle primary decree is in personam, and not in ren: Story Eq.
Jurisp., sect. 744 ; Uhickering v. Pailes, 29 Ill. 294. Before our
statute of 1861, permitting it to be done, a mere decree of a court
of chancery would not pass the legal title to land. It is said, in
answer, that the proceeding in partition here was at law under the
statute: but we can have no doubt that it was a proceeding in
chancery. The decree in partition here does not provide for conveyances at all, nor for giving possession or other enjoyment, and
extends no further than merely to make the partition. The decree
is in this respect imperfect, and leaves the division incomplete;
and although carried into effect in the respect of effecting a valid
partition of three interests-of Mrs. Garrett, the Crows and the
Flaglors-by the subsequent act of the parties in the interchange
of mutual deeds of release, it was still left and remained incomplete in the respect of investing the children of Charles with any
legal estate in the land beyond that which was given to them by
the will. In this latter respect the decree was incapable of being
executed until the necessary authority should be given by the entry
of a further order in the cause, or by a new bill to supply the
omission and for execution of the former decree. That decree
might have provided for the conveyance of the legal title by
Charles to be made then, or at a future day, when the events
requiring it, supposed in the decree, should occur ; or for the execution by Charles of a covenant to stand seised to the use of himself for life, remainder in fee to the children ; or for a conveyance
of the whole title in fee to a trustee upon the same trusts; and
then the execution of the decree might have been enforced by the
ordinary process of the court. As it is, the decree is but the expression of a purpose that the children should have the fee, without
accomplishing the object by its own force, or providing the means
for effecting its accomplishment.
Hence the present suit to enforce, by means of an independent
decree, a conveyance of the legal estate from the purchasers from
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Charles, and an account of the rents and profits of the land since
the time of his death. It is in its nature to obtain execution of
the decree in partition, and to supply the omission thereii, which
is necessary to the efficacy of the decree, as giving a icinainder in
fee. to the children.
Upon all the facts shown in this case, the court would not originally have made a decree like this one, limiting to Charles a lifeestate, and declaring a remainder over in fee to his children after
him.
There is authority for the doctrine that the court may, on a bill
to carry a decree into execution, look into the case to see if it will
make the same decree a second time. In such a ease it is said:
"It is competent for the court, in respect of the special application,
to examine the decree, and if it be unjust, to refuse enforcement :"
Adams's Eq. 416. Daniell (2 Chancery Practice 1614), citing
Lawrence v. Berney, 2 Chan. Rep., on this point, says:"It is laid down that, although where a decree is capable of
being executed by the ordinary process and forms of the court,
whatever the iniquity of the decree may be, yet, till it is reversed,
the court is bound to assist it with the utmost process the course
of the court will bear, but when the common process of the
court will not serve, and things come to be in such a state and
condition, after a decree made, that it requires an original bill, and
a second decree upon that, before the first decree can be executedif the first decree is unjust-then this court desires to be excused
in making it its own act, and to build upon such foundations, and
charging its own conscience with promoting an apparent injustice;
and this obliges the court to examine the grounds of the first
decree before it makes the same decree again."
In the case of O'Connell v. MeNamara, 3 Dru. & Warren 411,
Lord Chancellor SUGDEN said: "I do not understand the rule to
be that this court is bound to carry into execution an erroneous
decree. On the contrary, I apprehend that when a party comes
into this court asking for the benefit of a former decree, he must be
prepared to show, if the case requires it, that such decree was
right." And to the like effect are Hamilton v. trouhton, 2 Bligh,
P. C., 169, and Bean v,Smitli, 2 'Mason 252. There are, it is
admitted, authorities the other way on this subject. Story, in his
Equity Pleading, sect. 430, in speaking upon it, says: "The court
has even on circumstances refused to enforce the decree, although
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in other cases the court and the House of Lords, upon an appeal,
seem to have considered that the law of the decree ought not to be
examined on a bill to carry it into execution ;" and see Mitford
Chan. Pleading 96. And although it is insisted by appellee that
the authorities cited are totally inapplicable to such a case as the
present, we are willing to accept the principle declared as pertinent
to the case of a bill seeking the particular description of relief
asked in this case.
The estate of Charles under the will, we take it, was alienable
by him at any time after Garrett's, the testator's, death, and would
pass as a legal title to take effect in possession when it fully
accrued and became absolute. As the decree did not execute
itself, and contains no provision for its own execution, the case in
its nature is one of a declaration of gift by Charles to his children,
evidenced by a supposed consent decree made by the owner of a
legal interest, capable of immediate transfer, but never conveyed
to the donee8, or in trust for them. Even if a gift bad been
intenled, such a gift would not be complete; and when the alleged
gift is of a legal estate, capable of legal conveyance, which is not
made, the gift is revocable.
In Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Aesey 39, Sir WILLIAm GRANT,
Master of the Rolls, said: "There is no case in which a party has
been compelled to perfect a gift which, in the mode of making it,
he has left imperfect. There is a locu8 pcenitenfix as long as it is
incomplete, and Mr. Crawford did repent."
In Badgly v. Votrain, decided at the last June Term of this
court, in speaking upon this subject of a voluntary settlement, it
was said : "But if, on the other hand, the transaction is incomplete, and its final completion is asked in equity, the court will
not interpose to perfect the settlor's liability, without first inquiring
into the origin of the claim and the nature of the consideration
given." (See authorities there cited.) "And where there is no
consideration, the court, upon its general principles, cannot complete what it finds imperfect," there quoted, as the observation
made by Sir JOHN WIGRAM, in MeFadden v. Jenkins, 1 Hare
458. In 1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, sect. 433, it is laid down
as the doctrine, as declared by the weight of more recent adjudications, "that the court will not execute a voluntary contract, and
that the principle of the court to withhold its assistance from a
volunteer applies equally whether he seeks to have the benefit of a
contract, a covenant or a settlement."
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It is said by Fry, in his work on Specific Performance, pp. 70,
71, "that the court will not lend its assistance to enforce the
specific execution of contracts which are voluntary, or where no
consideration emanates from the party seeking the specific performance, even though they may have the legal consideration of a
seal. And this principle applies whether the contract insisted on
be in the form of an agredment, a covenant or a settlement." See
Otis v. Beckwith, 49 Ill. 121. We do not perceive why the same
principle may not properly apply in the case of an executory
decree, when in its nature a family settlement, as in case of an
executory contract. A gift capable of being made by a legal conveyance is as imperfect when created by an executory decree as
when it is created by an executory contract. When the title is
of a legal interest capable of a legal transfer, an executory decree
providing within itself no means for its execution, such as the
making of deeds to pass legal estates in land or otherwise, would
seem to be an imperfect creation of a trust or gift, even if a trust
or gift had been in fact intended. In this view there was, after
the entry of the consent decree, a locus pcenitentice for Charles,
and he availed himself of it, and revoked, so far as he might, the
operative force of the decree by his warranty deeds of conveyance
of the lands to Wadhams and Moses, purporting to convey an
estate in fee simple absolute, for a valuable consideration paid, and
by the bill of review proceeding, wherein lie procured a reversal
of the consent decree.

*

*

*

It is insisted by the appellee that the court should assist in behalf of this partition decree by consent, because it is res judicata,
and because it created an equitable estate in the children, which
the court should aid in making effectually available. It is evident
that there never has in fact been but one judicial determination as
to the relative rights of Charles and his children, and that was by
the decree on the bill of review, reversing the consent decree, and
declaring that Charles under the will took a remainder in fee, and
giving to him that estate. The bill of review alleged error of law
only; and when the record in the bill of review proceeding was
brought before this court on error the decree therein was reversed
solely on the ground ttna the decree of partition appeared to be
by consent, and that, therefore, a bill of review would not lie, on
the familiar legal ground that there can be no error of law alleged
against a judgment appearing to be entered by the consent of parties. And it was expressly said: "But we decide nothing as to
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the right of purchasers from Charles D. Flglor. That must be
left for future adjudication :" Plaglor v. Crow, 40 Ill. 418. It
was, however, there said as to the will: "Under the will, Charles
D. Flaglor was clearly entitled to the fee, after the death of Letitia; and this record furnishes no explanation of his self-denial in
taking only an estate for life." The decree in the partition suit
.declaring the representative interests of the parties, and appointing commissioners to set off the same, recites: "And it appearing
further from the answer of said Letitia Flaglor, Frederick T.
Flaglor and Charles D. Flaglor, filed herein, that the facts and
charges in said bill set forth are admitted, and the necessity of
such division admitted, and they assent to and desire the prayer
of said bill of complaint to be granted by this court; it is therefore ordered, adjudged," &c., declaring how the one-sixth part
should go to Charles and his children; which shows the decree to be
the consequence of the supposed consent, and not of the judgment
of the court.
In Jenkins v. .obinson, Law Rep. 1 Scotch Div. & App. Cases,
House of Lords 117, decided in 1867, it appeared an action
had been brought wherein a compromise was effected, in pur
suance whereof the court pronounced the judgment agreed upon.
Subsequently a new action was brought, bringing before the court
the same matter which was embraced in the judgment passed by
the court in the former case, and the question was, whether the
matter was res judicata. Lord Chancellor CHELMSFORD said:
"The interlocutor (judgment) in the former action having been the
result of a compromise between the parties, it cannot be considered
as a judicium, nor can it be admitted as resjudicata."
Lord ROMILLY said: "In my opinion re8 judicata signifies that
the court has, after argument and consideration, come to a decision
on a contested matter. Here the court exercised no judicial function upon the subject. It has merely exercised an administrative
function by recording the interlocutorwhich had been agreed to
between the parties.
In Edgerton v. MAuse, 2 Hill (So. Car.) 51, on application by
petition, before the decree of sale was executed, to correct an error
in the decree, in including a wrong piece of property in the property partitioned, O'NWEALL, J., said: "The court must exercise the
right of correcting its decrbes in ex parte cases and cases by consent, so long as they remain unexecuted; for, although they purport to be the act of the court, and as such have legal effect, yet,
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in point of fact, they are the mere act of the parties. Neither the
facts nor the law can be said to be judicially ascertained in such a
proceeding. The only restriction upon the exercise of this power
ought to be the execution of the decree. It is then that the
decree ought to be regarded as final, and to be an estoppel between
all parties and privies."
These judicial utterances are quoted, not as authority for disturbing anything which has been done, but as illustrative of judgments by consent, as differing from judgments in invitum; and the
extent to which they may be deemed to partake of the character of
the parties' own act of agreement.
We do not think that it militates with the doctrine of the conclusive effect of what is res judicata, that where there is an incomplete decree, and it is ineffective for the want of the provision of
any means for its execution, and an application is made to a court
of equity to supply the imperfection so as to render the decree
effective, that then it is admissible to look at the real nature and
character of the decree as it may appear in the light of surrounding circumstances, for the purpose of determining whether there is
such an equitable ground for action, as will move a court of equity
to interpose. Equity will penetrate beyond the covering of form,
and look at the substance of a transaction, and treat it as it really
and in essence is, however it may seem. In outward semblance,
this partition decree is a decision of the court upon the relative
rights of Oharles D. Flaglor and his children, under the will of"
Garrett. In essential character, it is but the judicially recorded
supposed agreement of Flaglor ; and upon an appeal to equity by
original bill to lend its assistance for carrying it into execution,
because of an omission in the decree in providing any means for

its execution, it would seem reasonable that the same rule of the
court's action should obtain, as in case of any solemn agreement
under seal; and, where there are manifest elements of injustice,
mistake, surprise, misapprehension and want of consideration, to
remain passive. We are satisfied that these elements are here
present; that the supposed consent decree was made without any
actual consent, and contrary to intention.
But it is insisted there was an equitable estate here, created in
the children of Flaglor, and (Cickeringv. Tailes, 29 Ill. 294,
is cited, where it is said that such a partition as there was here,
"was in equity a good and sufficient partition, whhi'h a court of
chancery would recognise and enforce between the parties, although
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not such a partition as vested in the parties the legal title to the
,,-hares assigned to each, for the want of mutual releases." And
so it may be said in the case of a written obligation to convey
lald. And yet in either case, upon application by bill to a court
of chancery to compel a conveyance of the legal title, the court
miglt decline to lend its assistance, if the case should be brought
.within tie established rules of non-interposition by a court of
equity. What there is here of an equitable estate is this: a decree taking away from one the fee and giving him instead a life
estate, not by judgment of the court, but upon the supposed consent of the party; and it turns out that no consent was ever
given, and that there was a contrary intention.
It is, so far as it has effect, in reality a wrongful divestiture of
property ; there is no ground in moral right, equity and conscience
to call upon a court of equity to interpose and assist in carrying
it into execution. The only ground is, that it stands a decree, a
technical right; and the true nature of the application is, to
enforce a technical estoppel. Of such estoppels Lord COKE said,
"they are odious." The one in question is eminently of the kind
alluded to in Jetter v. Htewett, 22 How. 364: "The res judicata
renders white that which is black, and straight that which is
crooked."
The decree rests on mistake. The jurisdiction of chancery is
exercisable in relief against mistakes; not to carry them into
effect.
*
*
*
It follows, then, that the decree of the court below in this case
should be reversed as to Wadhams, as well as in respect to the
Engles and Day; which is accordingly done, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Decree reversed.
WALKER, Chief Justice: I am unable to concur in either the
reasoning or conclusion reached by the majority of the court in
this case.
CRAIG, J.: I do not concur with the majority of the court in
the decision of this cause.
We have condensed

the foregoing

tionable grounds both of principle and

opinion from the Chicago Legal News,
and we must say, that notwithstanding
the dissent of able judges, it seems to
us the opinion rests upon most unques-

authority, and that its exposition of the
law and its illustrations anti arguments
are of the most satisfactory character.
There seem to us, however, to be two
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or three grounds not suggested in the
opinion, why the original decree never
could have been fairly regarded as settling the title as between Flaglor and
his children, and that the case might
well have been decided upon these
grounds alone.
1. A suit for partition in equity in
England, and equally in the statutory
modes given in many of the American
states, as well as in equity, has never
been regarded as an allowable mode of
settling the title to the land, even as
between the adversary parties in the
suit for partition. This is expressly
so ruled in Slade v. Barlow, L. R.
7 Eq. 296; Bolton v. Bolton, affirmed
by the Lords Justices in the Court
of Chancery Appeals and reported in
note to Slade v. Barlow, citing Potter v. Waller, 2 D. G. & Sm. 410.
Vice Chancellor STUART, in Giffard v.
Willians, L. R. 8 Eq. 494, attempted
indeed to maintain a different rule, but
tle case was reversed upon that ground :
L. R. 5 Ch. App. 546. Lord BATHERLEY, Chancellor, here said: "It
would not be proper for this court,
under color of making a decree for a
partition, in fact to decide the legal title
',The question
to this land." * * *
must be decided byajury." This decision is many years later than Sir John
Rolt's Act, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42. giving
the Court of Chancel'y power to decide
every question of law and fact cognisable in a court of common law and upon
the determination of which the title to
relief in equity depends. The question
is also considered in Agar v. Fairfax,
17 Ves. 533; Baring v. Nash, I V. &
B. 551 ; Parker v. Gerard, Amb. 236.
And the same rule is abundantly settled
in the American courts: Wilkin v. WIrilkin, 1 Johns. Ch. 117; Phelps'v,,Green,
3 Id. 305 ; Coxe v. Smith, 4 Id. 271,
276; J1anners v. Maraers,I Green Ch.
385 ; Garrett v. White, 3 Ired. Eq. 131.
So that we may regard it as most unquestionable, both here and in England,

that no question of title will ever be
determined in a partition suit, unless
sent to a court of law, or by distinct
and separate pleadings.
There could therefore be no presumption, from the general fact of a
judgment or decree of partition, that the
court passed upon any question of title,
even as between the adversary parties
to the proceeding, but only that such
parties acquiesced in the titles of each
other as respectively claimed, which expressly appears to have been the fact in
this particular case, since the entire
judgment in the original suit for partition was entered by consent. Upon
both grounds, then, upon well-settled
principles of law, there was no estoppel,
no res adjadicata. To this effect the
law has long been settled, by repeated
decisions that there must have been a
direct adjudication of the court to constitute res adjudicata, and that no judgment of court can operate as an estoppel upon any question or point not indispensable to the judgment. This is
the very point decided in Burlen v.
Shannon, 99 Mass. 200, and the authorities in support of the proposition are
here , ably reviewed by Mr. Justice
FOSTER. We might refer to a very
large number of cases of the best authority in support of the same view:
Hotchkiss v. Nichols, 3 Day 138; Coit
v. Tracg, 8 Conn. 268, where it is said:
19Facts found by a former decree, which
were not necessary to uphold the decree,
do not conclude the parties." So that
if the question of title between Flaglor
and his children had been expressly
passed upon in this judgment and so
expressly recited in the record, it would
create no estoppel, because not necessary to support the judgment and not
within any issue which was formed or
could properly have been formed in the
case: Woodgate v. .Feet,44 N. Y. 1 ;
People v. Johnson, 38 N. Y. 63. Thus
it is stated in Gray v.- Pingry, 17 Vt.
419, 423, that, "where the former trial
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is relied upon as settling some collateral
fiaet
involved in the present trial [in
other words, is relied upon as an estoppel], it mu't nppear by the record of the
briner judgment [or in some other way]
.hat the fact wats put distinctly in issue
by the parties in that case, and that it
was determined by the triers," and that
it was necessary to the upholding of the
judgment rendered in the former action:
Fooqlld v. inch, 2 B. & Ald. 668;
Fairmnz v. Bacon, 8 Conn. 418 ; Oatram v. Mforewood, 3 East 346 ; Hopkins v. £.e, 6 Wheat. 109 ; Jackson v.
l ood, 3 Wend. 27. But the mere admissions of the declaration or pleadings,
unless confirmed by the judgment of the
court, so as to become res adjudicata,
are not evidence at all in another action
between the same parties or privies
3oileau v. Rutlin, 2 Exch. 605.
2. The rule just stated, that no estoppel is created, will apply to a judgment
entered wholly by the consent of the
parties, the mind of the court not being
called to exercise any discretion in the
matter: Jenkins v. Robertson, L. R. I
H. of Lords, Scotch, 117. The rule is
otherwise when the facts only are agreed
by the parties, and the court enter the
proper judgment: Chamberlain v. PrehIe, 11 Allen 370.
A judgment of court, by consent, adds
nothing to the force of the original consent or compromise. Ajudgmentupon
a note or other security by confession,
will no doubt bar any future recovery
for the same cause of action, because
it absorbs and merges it ; but such a
judgment, we apprehend, would not be
conclusive as to the date or the particular form of the security upon which the
confession was made, but only as to the
essential basis of the judgment, viz., the
fact of indebtedness. This question is
virtually decided in Goucher v. Clayton,
11 Jur. N. S. 107 ; s. c. 13 W. R. 336,
where Lord IIATItELEY as V. C.WVooD

held, that one who had been sued for an
infringement of a patent and had con-

sented to a judgment for agreed damages, before declaration filed, was not
estopped to deny the validity of the
patent in a future action for further infringements. Tie learned judge said if
all the parties to both suits were the
same there would be no estoppel upon
that question, no issue having been
joined, or decided by the court, upon
that point. The only effect of the judgment was to show the fact of indebtedness to the amount embraced in it as a
choice of evils to save further litigation.
3. But there is a still more unanswerable view of the question as presented in the principal case. Here the
question of title, which it is claimed the
original judgment of partition conclusively settled and made res judicata,
was not one between the adversary
parties to the proceeding in partition,
but between the defendants representing
the same portion of the title. It requires no argument to show that no
judgment in :uny action can possibly
reach beyond the relations of the adversary parties. There is no opportunity
given to raise ny issue between the defendants, nor is the particular relation
subsisting among them in any manner
involved in the action. The direct decisions upon this very point are not
easily found, because few persons would
be likely to make any such claim. But
the points alreldy discussed render it
very obviouQ that no estoppel could be
created upon the relations and rights of
defendants as among themselves.
a. There is no opportunity for any
issue of that kind.
b. There coal(], of course, legitimately be no judgment upon any such
question, it not being properly in issue.
c. If it were fiund upon by the court
as a distinct question, and so appeared
upon the record, it would create no
estoppel, not being material to the judgment. All these three requisites we
have before seen are essential to create
resjudicata or n valid estoppel. In the
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principal action the will, after creating

security against all the signers would

three successive lifi estates, gave acon-

estop those who were in fact sureties for
the others from denyihfg, as between
themselves, that they were in lict principals, and thus compel them to bear their
proportion of the debt as joint principals.
This particular form of the que.stion has
become so familiar to business men
that any such claim would be regarded
as too preposterous to be seriously entertained by any one. But, in, principle, it seems to is the very same we are
discussing. It has been held competent
even to show, in order to avoid an
estoppel, that the point was not in fact
adjudicated, although it might have
been ; but it cannot he allowed to create
an estoppel by showing that matters
foreign to the record or to tile controversy were in fict passed upon : Camapbell v. Butts, 3 Oomst. 173 ; Athearn v.
Braanon, 8 Blackf. 440.
It has been held almost universally
that the relations of the makers of a
contract as between themselves are not
concluded by the terms of the contract.
Their relations among themselves depend upon implications and also upon
express contract often, which is not
excluded from being shown by oral
proof, although in conflict with the
terms of the written contract, which
was intended to define only the rights
and relations of tile adversary parties
to the contract, as between themselves: MhJcGee v. Prouty, 9 Mete.
547; Grtfton Bank v. Knt, 4 N. H.
221 ; Warner v. Price, 3 Wend. 397 ;
Grifith v. Reed, 21 Id. 502 ; Suydain v.
W1estfall, 4 Hill 211 ; Wing v. Terry,
5 Id. 160. We might go much further
in showing that neither a contract or a
judgment will fix the relations of the
adversary parties, as among the different members of ea I.-, but only as to
each other in solido, but we trust we
have already sufficiently fortified the
point. We have found but one ease
directly in point to show that a judgment creates no estoppel upon the

tingent remainder in fee to Flaglor, j"
he survired the lfe-tyuints; if not, to his
children, if then alive ; but if not, then
over.
Both Flaglor and his children
were made defendants, as representing
a portion of the title in the estate soizht
to be partitioned. It was not at all important to the proceeding that the apportionment of tie title aniong tile defendants should appear upon the proceedings for partition. All that was essential was that all, together, should sufficiently represent the title of the portion
not claimed by the petitioners. It
would have made tie proceeding none
the less effective had it been in terms
alleged, that the defendants (Flaglor
and his children) owned different interests or titles to that portion of the land
not claimed by the petitioners, which,
combined, amounted to the fee simple,
but that the particular portion of the
title held by such defendant was not so
known to the petitioners that they could

specifically set it forth in detail.

No

doubt where different defendants bold

title to separate aliquot portions of the
title that must be set forth in the peti-

tion, since that affects the partition,
which must be complete as to every aliquot proportion of the title, but not as
to subdivisions of the title in any par-

ticular aliquot portion, as that between
Flaglor and his children. There could
be no partition between them. There
are many analogous cases to be found
in the reports. In some banks it has
become common, in order to avoid all
questions of releasing sureties, by extension of the time of payment by contracts with the principal, to have each
signer of securities bind himself in express terms as principal, which estops
him from denying that relation ts to the
creditor: Sprigg v. Bank of,3it. Pleasant, 10 Pet. U. S. 257 ; 14 Id. 201.
But it was never supposed that a judgment in favor of the bank upon such
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rights of several defendants as be- of partition as between Flaglor and his
tween themselves : Rice v. Cutler, 17 children, as to the particular portion of
Wis. 351, where it was decided that no the title held by them at the time, hut
judgment could be rendered in faror that it then, and ever afterwards, deof one defendant against another defend- pended upon the terms of the devise.
ant. We could entertain no question The case might, we think, properly
that any court would so decide, when- enough, have been decided upon this
ever the question arose ; and so, unques- view. But the court correctly came to
tionably, would have been the decision the same conclusion upon other grounds,
in the principal case had the point been which may, and that is always an imbrought to the attention of the court. portant consideration in drawing up
For all the reasons hereinbefore stated,
opinions, possibly be more satisfactory
we can entertain no doubt there was no to some of the parties.
I. F. R.
estoppel created by the original decree

U. &. Circuit Court, Western -Districtof Missouri.
UNITED STATES v. MAXWELL.
Offences "not capital or otherwise infamous," may, by leave of court upon
complaint on oath, be prosecuted in the Federal courts by criminal information.'

AN information charging the defendant with several violations
of the internal revenue laws was filed by the District Attorney by
leave of court. Prior to the term, complaint on oath had been
made before a United States commissioner, charging the defendant
with the said offences against the revenue laws, and the defendant
was arrested upon a warrant issued by the commissioner, and held
to answer to the United States Circuit Court, and required to give
bail in the sum of $500, which he did. At the term, the District
Attorney, upon the said complaint, warrant and recognisance,
moved the court for leave to file a criminal information against the
defendant, charging him with the said offences, which leave was
granted and the information accordingly filed. The defendant
appeared and pleaded guilty. Afterwards his counsel made a motion
in arrest of judgment upon the ground that the defendant can only
be prosecuted -and punished criminally upon the presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, and not upon an information.
It was upon this motion that the case was before the court.
James S. Botsford, District Attorney, for the United States.
Maak J. Leaming, for the defendant.
DILLON, Circuit Judge.-The offence charged in the information
is a misdemeanor, and not a "capital or otherwise infamous
VOL. XXIII.-55
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crime." The defendant was originally arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by a commissioner of the United States, upon a
complaint duly made to him under oath, showing probable cause.
There is therefore no ground to claim that the guarantees of personal liberty secured by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution have been iolated, which provides that "no warrant shall
issue but upon probable dause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized."
The information was afterwards filed by leave of court, and the
defendant, after pleading guilty, moved in arrest of judgment.
This motion must be sustained, if there is no authority of law for
the prosecution of such misdemeanors in the Federal courts by
criminal information.
The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides
that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime, unless upon presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."
The offence charged against the defendant is not a "capital or
infamous crime." The words "infamous crime" have a fixed and
settled meaning. In a legal sense they are descriptive of an
offence that subjects a person to infamous punishment or prevents
his, being a witness. The fact that an offence may be or must be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, does not necessarily
make it, in law, infamous: 1 Bish. Cr. Law, sects. 70, 644; Bex
v. Hickman, 1 Moody 84; Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 W. & S.
838; Russell on Crimes 126; 1 Greenl. Ev., sects. 872, 378;
People v. Whipple, 8 Cowen 707; United States v. Shepard, 1
Abb. U. S. Rep. 481, 489.
The constitutional provision, therefore, as to the mode of prosecuting capital and infamous offences has no application to the misdemeanor set forth in the information.
But the question remains, whether other than capital and
infamous offence may be prosecuted in any other mode than upon
presentment or indictment of a grand jury. In other words, must
all Federal offences, 6f %ykatevercharacter or grade, be prosecuted
upon an accusation made by a grand jury?
The constitutional provision above quoted does not say that all
offences must be prosecuted with the sanction of a grand jury, but
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only that certain classes of offences must be. The fair implication
is that offences other than those falling within the classes specifically described may be prosecuted otherwise than through the intervention of a grand jury. And certainly as respects offences not
capital and not infamous, there is no restriction upon Congress as
to the mode of procedure; and as to such offences it is entirely
competent for Congress to provide that they shall be prosecuted
upon indictment or information, or in either mode. But there is
no Act of Congress prescribing in terms that such offences shall
be proceeded against by indictment or by information or otherwise.
Of course they may be prosecuted by indictment. This is admitted ; and it is clear from the fifth constitutional amendment
and from various provisions of Acts of Congress, in relation to
grand juries, &c., that it is contemplated that crimes of all grades
may be prosecuted upon the presentment or indictment of a grand
jury. But is it contemplated that all offences, although not infamous, must be thus prosecuted? There is no Act of Congress o
that effect, and no specific declaration of its will for or against
prosecutions by criminal information.
Criminal prosecution by informations for misdemeanors *as a
familiar roode of procedure in England, "as ancient," says Blackstone, 4 Com. 309, "as the common law itself;" and was the only
existing mode of prosecution, it seems, except by indictment or
presentment of a grand jury: Id. 308. It was a mode in daily
and constant use in England at the time of the American Revolution, as well as in American colonies. This was well known when
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution was adopted, which provided only for the previous action of a grand jury in capital or
otherwise infamous offences. If it had been intended wholly to
prohibit prosecution, by information, language expressive of such
intention would have been used. Congress has never enacted a
code of criminal procedure, and the states have no power to prescribe either modes of proceeding or rules of evidence in prosecucutions for Federal offences. In a general way the Federal courts
must be governed in these respects by the common law with the
modifications pointed out by the Supreme Court: United State8 v.
Reid, 12 How. 361.
Congress, nevertheless, created Federal offences, and clothed the
Federal courts with jurisdiction over sitch offences, and no legal
reason exists, in the absence of express legislation, why such
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offences must be prosecuted in only one of the two well-known
common-law methods.
Owing to causes not necessary here to notice (4 Black. Com.
309, 310), the proceeding by information was unpopular in England, and doubtless also in the colonies; and it has, inmany of the
states from a very early day, been either restricted or prohibited.
In the law lectures of JAMES WILSON, one of the justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States, which were delivered in
179 0, he recognises an information in the name of the state as one
mode of prosecuting crimes and offences; and, after referring to
the two kinds (one strictly public, and the other at the instance of
a private person or informer), says: "Restraints have, in England, been imposed upon the last species; but the first-those at
the King's own suit, filed by his attorney-general-are still unrestrained: 4 B1. Com. 307. By the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
both kinds are effectually removed. By that Constitution, however, informations are still 'suffered to live, but they are bound
and gagged. They are confined to official misdemeanors; and
even against those they cannot be slipped but by leave of the
court. By that Constitution, no person shall, for any indictable
offence, be proceeded against, criminally, by information, unless
by leave of the court, for oppression and misdemeanor in office:"
3 Wilson's Works 144, 145. See also 4 Wend. Bl. Com. 309,
note, as to Bill of Rights and Decisions in New York; Wharton's
Crim. Law, 7th ed., sect. 213.
Thus, by constitutional provision and positive legislation in the
states, informations, as a mode of criminal prosecutions, were
either very much restricted or abolished, and the result was, that
in the state courts, the prevailing method of prosecution was by
indictment, and naturally the same practice obtained in the Federal courts.
But the constitutional provision (Fifth Amendment) leaves all
offences open to prosecution by information, except those which
are capital or infamous, and there is no enactment of Congress
preventing a resort to this mode of procedure. On the contrary,
there are provisions in several Acts of Congress which imply that
informations may be filkkfor criminal offences: 1 Stats. at Large,
p. 98, sect. 7-32; 2 Id. p. 290, sect. 3 ; 3 Id. p. 305, sect. 179;
14 Id. p. 145, sect. 179.
And it has been several times expressly adjudged that offences
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not capital or otherwise infamous, may be prosecuted in the Federal courts by information: United ,States v. Waller, 1 Sawyer C.
C. 701, FIELD and SAWYER, JJ.; United States v. Shephard, 1
Abb. U. S. Rep. 431, WITHEY, J.; United States v. .Ebert, 1
Cent. Law J. 205, KREKEL, J. And such seems to have been
the opinion of Justice STORY: United States v. Mann, 1 Gall. C.
C. 3; 1 Id. 552, 554. And see Walsh v. United States, 3 Wood.
& M. 341; Bishop Crim. Prac., sects. 604-611; Contra, United
States v. Joe, 4 Ch. Legal News 105. In The United States v.
Is ham, 17 Wall. 496; The United States v. Buzzo, 18 Id. 125, the
proceeding by criminal information does not seem to have been
questioned in either court. See also Territory of Nebraska,ex rel.,
.C., v. Lockwood, 3 Wall. 532; Stockwell v. United States, 13
Id. 531.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that offences not capital or infamous, may, in the discretion of the court, be prosecuted by information. We cannot recognise the right of the district attorney to
proceed on his own motion, and shall require probable cause of
guilt to appear by the oath of some credible person before we will
allow an information to be filed and a warrant of arrest to issue.
tut with. these safeguards there is no more reason to fear an
oppressive use of informations than there is reason to fear an
abuse of the powers of a grand jury. Where the accusation is a
grave one, or where the charge seems to be doubtful, the court
will refuse leave to file an information and compel the district
attorney to lay it before a grand jury. But it is well known that
the internal revenue laws have created a large number of minor
offences, many of them involving no moral turpitude, and that the
cost of proceeding by a grand jury and the delay are burdensome
and inconvenient both to the government and the defendant.
In this class of cases, most of which are not defended, great and
unnecessary expenses will be saved by proceeding by information,
and we not only think the practice legal, but one which, in cases
of this kind, should, with the restrictions above mentioned, be
adopted and encouraged rather than condemned. The courts in
this country have never been made the instruments of power in
oppressing the citizen, and it can, perhaps, further be safely
affirmed that the government has yet to attempt to make use of
the machinery of the law for that purpose; and if it should, it
seems quite probable that it would be as easy to secure an indict-
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merit from a grand jury, as the consent of the court to the filing
of an information. This line of observation is, however, scarcely
called for,. since the court is only concerned on the motion with
the lawfulness of a prosecution by information, and is not obliged
to vindicate the propriety or policy of this mode of procedure.
The motion in arrest of judgment is overruled.
In March 1874, the practice was
adopted in the Western District of Missouri of prosecuting misdemeanors and
especially revenue offences by information. The novelty of the practice, together with the fact that the AttorneyGeneral of the United States has, without effect, twice appealed directly to
Congress for this authority, gave rise
to serious doubts, both as to its legality
and policy. The practice was first
sanctioned by the District and now by
the Circuit Court.
By the common law, certain misdemeanors could be prosecuted by criminal
information; but whether statutory fines,
penalties and forfeitures could be collected in that way is a matter of doubt.
Blackstone says: "The objects of the

upon information, to hear and determine, without a jury, all offences (except treason, murder and felony) comivas
mitted against any statute. -'"t
by color of this act that Empson and
Dudley were enabled to effect such infinite oppressions and exactions upon
the people.

For this purpose, too, a

new office was created, and those two
persons were made masters of the king's
forfeitures :" 3 Reeves's Hist. Eng. Law
159. The reason for repealing this act
is stated to be "for that by force
thereof it was known many sinister,
crafty, feigned and forged informations
had been pursued against many of the
king's subjects, to their great damage
and vexation." There is no doubt but
that Congress has the power under the
king's own prosecutions, filed ex officio Constitution to provide for the prosecuby his own attorney-general, are pro- tion of this class of offences by intfrmaperly such enormous misdemeanors as tion ; but the question is, can this be
peculiarly tend to disturb or endanger done without such legislation ? It is
his government, or to molest or affront clear that all offences cognisable by the
him in the regular discharge of his royal Federal courts may be prosecuted 16y
functions. For offences so high and indictment; the Constitution and the
dangerous in the punishment or preven- legislation of Congress establishing the
tion of which a moment's delay would grand jury system imply this. There
be fatal, the law has given to the crown have been some distant allusions to inthe power of an immediate prosecution formations in several Acts of Congress,
without waiting for any previous appli- but that body has expressly provided for
cation to any other tribunal :" 4 Bl. the prosecuting of offences against the
Com. 309. Informations of this char- elective franchise by information ; Rev.
acter, and for the purposes mentioned Stat. United States 190, 1022 ; which
would seem to imply a denial of this
by Blackstone, were in general use as
early as the reigns of Henry VI. and power in all other cases. The general
Edward IV., but they were not com- principle is, that where an offence is
f collect- created by statute, and no remedy is
monly used for the purpos
any
ing statutory fines and penalties. By provided, it may be punished by
the
to
adapted
remedy
common-law
statute Henry VII. c. 3, justices of
case. We have already seen that a
assize and of the peace, were authorized,
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remedy by indictment has been provided, though not declared to be exclusive. The decision in the above-reported case is not based upon any
flailure of Ciingress to provide a remedy,
for it is admitted that an indictment
would lie, and the difficulty in the way
of invoking a remedy at common law
is that there is no common law in force
in the United States: State of Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling Bridge Co., 13
llxw. 518; Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean 568. In the case of Wheaton 4Donaldsoa v. Peters, 8 Pet. 658, the
court says: "It is clear there can be
no common law of the United States.
The Federal government is composed of
twenty-four sovereign and independent
states, each of which may have its local
usages, customs and common law.
There is no principle which pervades
the Union, and has the authority of law,
that is not embodied in the Constitution
or laws of the Union. The common
law could be made a partof ourFederal
system only by legislative adoption.
When, therefore, a common-law right
is asserted, we must look to the state in
which the controversy originated." If
the Constitution has not prohibited this
prhctice, as it certainly has not, it has
not authorized it, and there is about as
much in the Acts of Congress against
as for it.
That the adoption of this practice
throughout the whole country would be
a means of great economy is obvious ;
and we have heard the annual saving
to the government thereby estin.ated at
one million of dollars. And if there is
any danger of abuse of power by officials, its exercise could be regulated and
guarded by legislation. One thing we
would regard as a condition precedent
to the general and authoritative adoption of this practice; and that is, to

compensate the district attorneys by a
salary adequate to their labor and responsibility, so as not only to remove
them from the temptation to multiply
informations, but to prevent the possibility of their being suspected of doing
so from motives of interest. It is true
that the court may require an information to be based upon an affidavit ; but
in the practical administration of the
law, what means has the court of knowing the motives or character of the
person making the same ? The district
attorney presents an information, and
how can the court know but that the
person making the affidavit is a secret
spy or a professional informer? How
can the court know but that a system of
espionage is being fostered? "Next in
importance to personal freedom is immunity from suspicions and jealous observation. Men may be without restraints upon their liberty; they may
pass to and fro at their leisure ; but if
their steps are tracked by spies and informers, their words noted down for
crimination, their associates watched as
conspirators,-who shall say that they
are free ? Nothing is more revolting to
Englishmen than the espionage which
forms part of the administrative system
of continental despotisms. It haunts
men like an evil genius, chills their
gayety, restrains their wit, casts a
shadow over their friendships, and
blights their domestic hearth. The
freedom of a country may be measured
by its immunity from this baleful
agency:" 2 May's Con. Hist. Eng.
275.
The above observations are made
with the view of exciting the interest of
others in the subject, and not for the
purpose or with the hope of adding to
or detracting from the able opinion of
the court.
H. B. Josxsor.
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Court of Appeals of Yew York.
NATII. H. GATES v. WM. BEECIIER.
In order to charge the endorser of a joint note, demand must be made on ali
the makers.
The note of partners does not come within this rule, as they are but one maker
in contemplation of law, and a' demand on any of them is a sufficient demand
oil all.
After a dissolution of a partnership by bankruptcy or otherwise, the powers of
the several partners to affect each other by new contracts ceases, but each retains

the power to settle up the former business, and hence the dishonor of a note by
either partner is sufficient even after dissolution to charge an endorser.
The notice of dishonor to an endorser is only required to be such as will reasonably apprise him of the particular paper on which he is to be charged. Therefore,
in the absence of evidence to show that the endorser was misled, or that there was
any other note to which it might apply, a notice which gave the maker's name,
the date and amount of the note, the date when, the place where and the person

of whom demand was made and the refusal to pay, was held sufficient, although
it did not expressly state the time when the note came due.

THIS was an action upon a promissory note, against the enidorser.
The facts are sufficiently indicated in the opinion.
..

T. Hubbard, for appellant Beecher.

ff. J. Cookingham, for Gates.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
In
of
business
of
place
the
usual
at
payment
of
demand
such case,
residence,
or
at
his
is
sufficient;
he
be
absent,
the maker, though
or of him in person: I1oltz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634. And where
such a note is made by a partnership, a demand of one of the
partners in person, or a demand at the usual place of business of
the partnership, is sufficient: Story on Prom. Notes, § 239.
'The makers of the note in suit were partners, and it was made
by them as such in their partnership name; demand of payment
was made on the proper day of one of them in person, after the
notary had on the same day gone to the last usual place of business of the partnership, for the purpose of making demand there,
and found no one of th-erm. The name of the firm was Bassett,
Beecher & Co., and on the question being asked Bassett, when a
witness, "When did Bassett, Beecher & Co. stop business?" he
replied, 11They were thrown into bankruptcy in June 1871." I
think that we may infer from this that by proceedings in the
FOLGER, J.-No place of payment was named in the note.
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Bankrupt Court the partnership was declared bankrupt, and its
affairs taken charge of by the officers of the law. The partners
had separated, though there was no formal dissolution of their
partnership by them. But bankruptcy of one member, or of all
the members of a firm, works a dissolution of the copartnership:
Story on Part., § 313. On this state of facts and the law, it is
contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
demand for payment of the note should have been made of each
of -the former partners. He cites no authority for his position. I
have been unable to find any. If by the dissolution of the partnership by bankruptcy, and the separation of the partners, they
must thereafter be treated as joint makers who are not partners, I
think that the force of the authorities is that to charge an endorser
of their note a demand must be made of each of them, save where
the other circumstances are such as to excuse a demand. For to
charge the endorser of the note of joint makers not partners, demand must be made on each. It was so held in Union Bank v.
Willis, 8 Mete. 504, which case was approved in Arnold v.
Dresser, 8 Allen 435. In Willis v. Green, 5 Hill 532, NELSON,
C. J., said it was so settled. Earris v. (lark, 10 Ohio 5, is to
the contrary; but that case is limited in Greenough v. Smead, 3
Ohio Si. 415. It is seen, therefore, that there is a distinction
tpken between the case of a note of joint makers who are not
partners, and a note of partners, who are still partners at the. maturity of the note. That distinction rests upon the fact that partners are but one person in legal contemplation ; that each partner
acting in such capacity is not only capable of performing what all
can do, and of receiving and paying out that which belongs to all,
but by such acts necessarily binds them all; that, as incident to
such joint relations, all of the partners are affected by the knowledge of one. These things do not pertain to the relation of joint
makers who are not partners. Hence, while a demand of one partner is equivalent to a demand of all, a demand of one of joint makers
not partners, is not: 8 Mete., supra. And so a demand upon one
partner is sufficient, because he represents the firm, and a dishonor
by one is a dishonor by all, and each is presumed to have authoritv to act for the others; while in the case of a note of joint
makers not partners, the endorser has a right to rely upon the
responsibility of all and each, and may insist upon a dishonor by
each: Story on Prom. Notes, § 255. So that the inquiry seems
VOL. XXIII.-56
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to be, whether a dissolution of a partnership, effected by the bankruptcy thereof, has so far changed the relations of the members
of it as that the act or knowledge of one does not affect all the
rest. Undoubtedly, a dissolution of a partnership, however brought
about, puts an end to certain of the joint powers and authority of
all the partners. Perhaps it may be said that no one of the part.
ners can do any act in any manner inconsistent with the primary
duty of winding up the whole concerns of the copartnership. This
is emphatically the case when the dissolution has been wrought by
the bankruptcy of the firm, for then the effects thereof have passed
into the control of the court, and all payments therefrom or
chargeable thereon, are to be in the direction of the court, or
according to its rules and practice. The principle on which a
partner, during the existence of the partnership, may by his act
bind his copartners, is that which governs the relation of agent and
principal. The power of an agent to bind his principal ceases
when the agency is ended; so that even a payment by a former
agent of a valid debt against his former principal, gives him no
right against the latter. The principle has not, however, been
carried so far in the ease of a copartner. His relations with the
other members of the firm have not been entirely severed. He
may from his own means pay a valid subsisting debt against the
copartnership, and have the right to claim an allowance therefor
on the settlement of the affairs, or contribution from the others:
Major v. fHawkes, 12 Ill. 298. And the general statement has
been made by a text-writer of repute, that every act of administration which is necessary for winding up the concern may be
effectually done by one partner, and the rest be bound; 2 Bell
Comm. Bk. 7, c. 2, p. 643, 5th ed.; and the author expressly
includes in this a case of dissolution by bankruptcy, though it is
apparent that the property of a bankrupt concern may not be
meddled with by one of its former members. But it is clear that
the relations of the individual members of the firm are not by a
dissolution thereof so completely severed as that no act of one can
have any effect upon the others: Bobbins v. Fuller,24 N. Y. 570.
Each and all have still an interest in the settlement of the affairs
of the firm, in the payment of its debts, and the adjustment of the
liability of each to it and to each other, and in the just division
of any surplus. Though the copartnership be insolvent, as in this
case, and it be declared bankrupt, the members individually may
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be solvent and liable to be affected by the final result of the bankrupt proceedings. And so there does, after a dissolution, still
continue such a common interest in past transactions and in the
present and future legitimate consequences therefrom, as that a
joint power and authority in relation thereto continues; and
while, after dissolution, no member of the late firm can by his act
create a new liability against his former copartners, 24 N. Y.,
supra; or bind them to an alleged liability, lackley v. Patrick,
3 J. R. 536; or revive an extinct one, Van Kenren v. Parmelee,
2 N. Y. 525, he may do some acts which shall affect and be binding upon them, when such acts are confined to matters in which
they all still have a common interest and are under a common
liability. Thus it has been held that one who was once a member
of a dissolved partnership, which in its lifetime had endorsed a
note in the firm-name, might after dissolution waive demand of
payment and notice of non-payment: Darlingv. fareh, 22 Maine
184; which decision was put upon the principle that, though dissolution revoked all power to make a new contract, it did not revoke
the authority to arrange those before created and yet subsisting.
And it being so, that the act of one of former partners, in relation
to a valid subsisting liability of the late firm, does affect the others,
arid is taken as their act, and his knowledge thereof as-their knowledge, there seems no reason why the refusal of one to pay on
demand a note of the partnership should not be deemed the refusal
of all, ana all be chargeable therewith. And then a demand of
payment made to one is a demand of payment made to all, and is
sufficient upon which to give notice of non-payment to their
endorser. And further in aid of this idea, it is to be remembered
that the contract of the endorser of the promissory note of a
copartnership is that he will pay if the copartnership does not,
while that of the endorser of the note of joint makers is that he
will pay if neither of them does. One joint maker not a partner
of the other may not be able to speak for the other as to-his
ability or disposition to protect his promise and to save his
endorser from liability, while one partner, though the firm has
been dissolved, is supposed to know and care as much as the others
of its ability and willingness in those respects. Again, the purpose of demand and notice to the endorser is that he, being made
knowing of the failure to pky by the copartnership, may be put at
once on his guard, to save himself, if may be, from loss. This end
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is achieved when one of former partners has refused to pay, as well
as when all have. Taking all the reasons for the distinction made
by the law between the case of a note of joint makers who are
partners, and of that of joint makers who are not partners, and
all the reasons for requiring a demand of payment of the maker,
and notice thereof and of refusal to the endorser, in order to charge
him, we are of the opinion, that the rule that a demand of one
copartner is sufficient, applies as well where the partnership has
been dissolved as where it has not. It follows that the demand
of payment in this case was sufficient. We find that this view is
sustained in brief opinions in Crowley v. Bar y, 4 Gill 194; Brown
v. Tanner, 15 Ala. 832.
It is contended by the appellant that the paper sent to him
by mail, intended as a notice of demand and refusal of payment
of the note, and of protest therefor, was insufficient for that purpose. It is positive and explicit enough as to the fact of the
presentment of the note for payment, as to the day on which, the
place where, and the person to whom, the presentment was
made; as to the refusal to pay; as to the protest for non-payment against the maker and endorser. The only direct description it gives of the note is that it was a note of Bassett,
Beecher & Co., dated May 81st 1870, for $800. It contained the
name of the makers of the note, which is the most descriptive feature of a note; so says DENIo, J., in Rome Ins. Co. v. Green, 19
N. Y. 518. It did not mention the time of payment otherwise
than as it might possibly be inferred from the naming of the day
on which it was alleged to have been presented for payment. But
the absence of the statement of the time of payment, even at the
same time with the absence of statement of the date and amount,
there being no evidence of any other note to which the notice could
apply, has been held not a fatal omission: Shelton v. Braithwaite,
7 Mees. & Wels. 436. So the omission of the date and time of
payment was held not fatal: Youngsv. Kee, 12 N.Y. 551. Indeed
the rule is no more stringent than that the notice must reasonably
apprise the party of the particular paper on which he is sought to
be charged, and no precise form is required: 19 N. Y., supra. A
mistake or misdescription of the note will not render the notice
insufficient, if it do not mislead the endorser, and if it so designates and distinguishes the note as to leave no reasonable doubt in
the mind of the endorser what note was intended, and that it was
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the same with the note in suit: Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Mete. 495,
per SHrAW, C. J. In the absence of any evidence tending to show
that the defendant was misled, or was not informed by this notice
of what note was referred to in it, or to show that there was any
other note of these makers, of this date, for this amount, on which
this defendant was an endorser, or to which the description given
could possibly apply, it must be held that it sufficiently conveyed
to him information that the note now in suit was the one to which
it related. It gave the date, the amount, the names of the makers,
and by inference the time of payment. If there were other notes,
or another note, with which the one described in the notice could
have been confounded, there should have been evidence given of
that fact. It is not enough that it was possible that such may have
been the fact.
The point is not well taken that the case was not submitted to
the jury. The case shows that the appellant informed the court
that he did not wish to go to the jury on any question. This
means more, in the connection in which it is found, than that he
did not wish to address the jury. It means that there is no question of fact upon which there is chance for difference.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.

Supreme Caurt of HicMcgan.
STEPHEN CUTTER v. ZOROASTER BONNEY

ET AL.

An innkeeper is not liable for the loss of his guest's goods unless it be by his
negligence.
An innkeeper is held to guarantee the good conduct of his servants and all
other persons in his house. Hence when the goods of a guest are stolen or otherwise disappear in an unexplained way, the loss is presumed to be in consequence
of the innkeeper's negligence.
But where the loss happens by an accidental fire or other casualty coming from
without, and of such nature as to negative his negligence, he is not liable.

Tris was an action to recover the value of certain horses, a
wagon, &c., destroyed by fire in the barn of defendants, who were
innkeepers.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-It is found by the court in the case stated that
there was no fault or negligence in defendants or their servants,
the fire which destroyed the barn and its contents having been
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either accidental or incendiary, and taking from an alley or public
way outside. No question arises upon anything except the obligation of innkeepers to respond to their guests for property thus
destroyed without negligence. It is admitted the property was in
the dustody of defendants in that capacit3
It is unfortunate that upon this subject there is some confusion,
arising from the loose dictaz in which many courts have indulged,
when dealing with cases involving the liability of innkeepers. It
is unsafe to give any force to such remarks beyond the analogies
of the cases in which they are found. Upon all questions not decided by recognised and accepted precedents, we can only rest
upon the ancient maxims of the common law.
In order to hold a bailee liable for that which is in no respect to
be imputed either to his own negligence or to that of persons for
whom he is responsible, there should be found clear authority.
The common law has declared this liability against one class of
bailees, and has made common carriers responsible for all losses
not caused by public enemies, or some casualty in no way arising
out of human action. It is claimed by plaintiffs that in this respect common carriers and innkeepers stand on precisely the same
footing; and it is not claimed that defendants can be made liable
in the present case on any narrower ground.
There are many cases in which it has been said by judges that
the liability is not distinguishable. Most of these have been collected in the notes to the last edition of 2 Kent's Commentaries
596. But, except in the decisions to be specially referred to hereafter, there is nothing in the facts of any authority which we have
discovered, which called for any such remark, or which would
justify the enforcement of a liability for such a loss as the present.
With one or two exceptions, the cases referred to have arisen
from thefts or unexplained losses of property while it was within
the legal custody or protection of the innkeeper. The rule
actually applied in all of these cases has been that all such losses
were presumably due to the neglect of the innkeeper. Generally,
and perhaps universally, he has been held to an absolute responsibility for all thefts from within, or unexplained, whether committed
by guests, servants or strangers. But he has quite as uniformly
been discharged by any negligence of the guest conducing to the
injury, and he has not been held for acts done by the servants of
guests, or ,by those whom they have admitted into their rooms.
And in many cases he has been held discharged where the guest
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has exercised any special control over his property. The general
principle seems to be that the innkeeper guarantees the good conduct of all persons whom lie admits under his roof, provided
his guests are themselves guilty of no negligence to forfeit the
guaranty.
Beyond this, we have found no decided cases anywhere. We
have found no decision holding innkeepers liable for losses by
purely accidental casualties, or from riots or acts of force from
without, such as have been from the beginning excepted by the
text-writers. These writers, or at least such of them as are of
recognised authority, have drawn a line between carriers and
innkeepers, resting on the distinction between absolute and qualified responsibility. And none of the accepted writers have found
any authority for disregarding this distinction. The two classes
of bailees have been kept carefully separate.
Judge STonY makes this very clear in his Treatise on Bailments, § 472, when lie refers to authorities which we think sustain
him. Dawson v. Chauncey, 5 Q. B. 164, is directly in point, and
the language of the older decisions there referred to excludes the
extreme measure of liability. Chancellor KENT is equally explicit
that the. liability does not extend to robbery or inevitable casualty:
2 Kent's Com. 593. The Roman law, to which both of them
refer, included fire under this head. The French law excludes
liability for wrongs from without: Ferriere Die. "Aubergistes ;"
Story on Bailments, § 465. But all the modern authorities profess to take their departure from Calye's Case, 8 Co. 82. That
case declares that the original writ quoted in it (and found in
Fitzherbert's N. B. 94 a) contains the whole ground of the common
law. Analyzing the writ, the fourth beading is made to refer to the
ground of liability as the default of the innkeeper, "by which
it appears that the innholder shall not be charged, unless there
be a default in him or his servants, in the well and safe-keeping
and custody of their guest's goods and chattels within his common
inn." The language in Fitzherbert is "so that by default of tbem,
the innkeepers or their servants, no damage may come in any
manner to the guests." Among the defences giyen by Saunders
is that "defendant may show that his house was broken open, and
a forcible robbery of them committed by thieves: 2 Saund. P1. &
Ev. 217. And the liability-of innkeepers for the acts of others
is put by Blackstone on the ground that they were bound to prevent misconduct by those under their control: 1 Bl. 430. Acci-
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dental fire stands on quite as strong grounds of exemption as other
mishaps.
The common law has in some things been modified by decisions,
but it is contrary to law to follow dicta made in cases calling for
no departure from the old law. It would be a manifest innovation
to create a liability where no possible default exists, and to sustain
such an innovation there ought to be both reason and authority.
We cannot object to follow settled law on our own views of what
policy ought to make it. But we are not prepared to assume there
is any policy which will compel persons who are in no wise in
fault, to respond in damages, where the law is not clear against
them. And the authorities directly in point on losses by fire are
not numerous, and do not, in our judgment, call for any such consequences.
The doctrine imposing such a liability may be said to rest
entirely on what was said by Justice PORTER in Hfulett v. Smith,
83 N. Y. 571. In that case the subject is discussed at some
length, and with much ability. But no foundation is shown there
for the doctrine asserted, beyond remarks which are confessedly
opposed to the text-books, and which were foreign to whAt was
actually decided in the cases where they are found. The whole
opinion of the learned judge is open to the same criticism, as he
himself declares the point discussed did not really arise, inasmuch
as no proof was introduced changing the presumption raised by
law against the defendant. The opinion was not unanimous, and
the dissent of Judge DENIO would detract much from its force,
even if it had been pertinent to the facts.
Opposed to this is the case of Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vermont
177, in which Judge REDFIELD, delivering the opinion of the
court, reached the conclusion that where there was no negligence
there was no responsibility for loss by fire. This opinion is an
able one, and was not given beyond the facts. It has been both
approved and criticised, but no occasion has heretofore arisen to
consider its correctness upon similar facts. Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush (Ky.) 42, is to the same effect; but there, too, the
decision might have rested on other grounds, and its authority is
therefore diminished.
We regard the decision in Vermont as reasonable, and as within
the fair meaning of the common-law rule. We think the Circuit
Court was right in taking the same view.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
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Supreme Court of Kansas.
JOHN BRANDON v. MARY ANN BRANDON.
Upon granting a divorce, whether on account of the fault of the wife or the
husband, the court has power to award to her the possession of the homestead.
When the record shows that a divorce was granted on account of the habitual

drunkenness of the wife, this court cannot hold that it was error to give to her the
cure and custody of two infant children, in the absence of any evidence showing
that the husband was a iuitable person to have such care and custody.
TiE court below granted to plaintiff a divorce on account of the
fault of defendant, on the charge of habitual drunkenness, but
awarded the defendant the care, custody, nurture and education
of the two minor children of the said plaintiff and defendant, one
three and a half years old and the other only one year old.
The court further decreed that the defendant should have and
retain the possession of the homestead of the plaintiff during her
natural life, and that the plaintiff should forthwith deliver possession of said premises to said defendant.
The court further adjudged that plaintiff should pay as further
alimony $25 per month, and that there should be allowed, assigned and set-off to the defendant, to her own sole and separate property, all the clothing of herself and said two minor children, and all the household and kitchen furniture in said house,
excepting two medium-sized bedsteads and the bedding thereof, to
be retained by the plaintiff, and then adjudged that the defendant have and recover of and from the plaintiff the costs taxed
at $204.97. From this decree the plaintiff appealed.
Art. XV., sect. 9, of the Constitution provides as follows:A homestead to the extent of one hundfed and sixty acres of
farming land, or of one acre within the limits of an incorporated
town or city, occupied as a residence by the family of the owner,
together with all the improvements on same, shall be exempted
from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife when that relatiou' exists.
By art. II, sect. 18 : All power to grant divorces is vested in
the District Courts, subject to regulation by law.
By the Statute of Kansas, Laws of 1870, sect. 27, p. 180,
"If the divorce shall arise by reason of the fault or aggression
of the wife, she shall be barred of all right of dower in the lands.
VOt. XXIII.-57
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of which her husband shall be seised at the time of filing the
divorce, or which he may thereafter acquire, whether there be
issue or not; and the court shall order restoration to her of the
uhole of her lands, tenements or hereditaments not previously
disposed of, and also such share of her husband's real or personal
property or both, as to the court may appear just and reasonable.
F. P.

itzwilliams, for appellant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.-Upon this record two questions are presented.
It is insisted in the first place that the court could not lawfully
decree possession of the homestead to defendant during her natural
life, and require plaintiff to vacate it. " It appears that the title
to the homestead was in plaintiff, and the argument is that the
defendant's interest in the homestead arose from her relation as
wife to plaintiff; that when that relationship ceased, as it did
by the decree of divorce, her rights and interest therein ceased,
and the proporty remained as the absolute property of the husband; that it was his homestead, he retnaining the head of a family;
and that being his homestead, he could not, under the constitutional
provision, be in this way forced to surrender it to any one. The
argument is ingenious and forcibly put by counsel in his briefbut, we are constrained to say, is not sound. The .divorce and
the adjustment of property interests are not to be regarded as
transpiring at different times, but as cotemporaneous. The homestead of the plaintiff is not given to a stranger destitute of all interest
and right therein, but the homestead of the husband and wife (for
it is equally the homqstead of each) is upon their separation assigned to one of them. There would be manifest impropriety in
attempting to continue it as the homestead of each after the
divorce, and in awarding it to the wife the court is but choosing
between conflicting interests. The fact that the title to the homestead property is in the husband, does not give to him any greater
interest in it as a homestead. His deed of it conveys no more
than hers. He can no more encumber or alienate it by a direct
proceeding than she. Perhaps by contracting for improvements
thereon he may have more power than she to make it liable to
judicial sale, though thus only indirectly does he affect it. That
he has even this power greater than she, we do not now positively
decide, leaving the question to be examined and decided whenever
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it is fairly before us.

But whatever he may do directly or indi-

rectly affecting the title, in so far as it is a homestead it is the
homestead of each, and upon a divorce the court has power to
assign it to either. The statute expressly gives to the court the
power in case of a divorce, whether granted for the fault of the
wife or the husband, to give to her such share of her husband's real
or personal estate as shall be just and reasonable: Laws 1870, p.
180, sect. 27.
The assignment of the homestead to the wife is within the terms
of this power, and if it be said that the protection of the Constitution is placed around a homestead, it may also be said that the
power to grant divorces is also by the Constitution expressly given
to the District Courts: Const. Art. II. sect. 18. And the constitutional grant of power to divorce is broad enough to include the
power to determine the subordinate and dependent questions of the
family property and the care and custody of the children. In
this case we have only the question of power to determine, for as
the testimony is not before us, we are unable to form any opinion
as to the propriety of the assignment of the homestead .to the wife.
As a second question in this case, it is asserted that it was error
to award the custody of the children to one found to be an habitual
drunkard. Here also we labor under the disadvantage of having
none of the testimony bearing on this question before us. We
cannot say that the court erred, because we do not know what facts
were before it. The character of the husband, the associations
by which he was surrounded, his constant absence from home, may
have all been so shown in evidence as to make it apparent that it
was unwise to give him the custody, and it may have been awarded
to her as the least of two'evils. We do not mean to say that any
such testimony was introduced, for the record is silent thereon, but
we do hold that unless it affirmatively appears that there was none
such or similar, we cannot say that it was error to award the custody
to the mother rather than to the father. The children were of
tender years and needed a mother's care; and if she was at all
suitable she ought to have the care of them during their infancy.
The court reserved in the order, as it had the right to do, the
power to change the custody; and if, after the children pass that
age which especially demands a mother's care, her habits of
drunkenness should continu.e, and the father appear to be a proper
person to have the charge of them, we cannot doubt that the court

